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Abstract 
Motivated by cycles of intergroup revenge in real-world conflicts, we experimentally 
test the hypothesis that humans practice group-based reciprocity: if someone harms or 
helps them, they harm or help other members of that person’s group. Subjects played a trust 
game, then allocated money between other people. Senders whose partners returned more 
in the trust game gave more to that partner’s group members. The effect was about half as 
large as the effect of direct reciprocity. Receivers’ allocations to group members were not 
affected by their partners’ play in the trust game, suggesting that group reciprocity was 
only triggered by strong norm violations. We discuss the role of group reciprocity in 
conflict among early humans. 
Keywords: Upstream reciprocity, group identity, intergroup conflict. 
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1 Introduction 
Human society is organized in groups, including families, clans, firms and nations. This structure 
is reflected in individual behaviour and cognition. Humans identify with their ingroup and are 
altruistic and prosocial towards ingroup members; towards outgroup members, they may display 
stereotyping and prejudice (Balliet, Wu, and De Dreu, 2014; Chen and Chen, 2011; Chen and Li, 
2009; De Dreu, Balliet, and Halevy, 2014; Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Yamagishi and Kiyonari, 
2000). Group structure provides the backdrop for intergroup conflict—from economic and 
political competition to inter-ethnic violence and war—which is pervasive in the species (Esteban, 
Mayoral, and Ray, 2012) and has serious economic costs (World Bank, 2011). 
Intergroup conflicts often follow a tit-for-tat logic, in which one group’s violence leads to 
revenge from the other side (Chagnon,1988;Haushofer,Biletzki, and Kanwisher, 2010; Horowitz, 
1985; Horowitz, 2001; Shayo and Zussman, 2010). This suggests that humans practice intergroup 
reciprocity. Reciprocity is a well-known mechanism that may underlie the evolution of 
cooperation (Nowak, 2006, 2012). While in direct reciprocity, individuals help those who have 
helped them in the past (and similarly for harm), in indirect reciprocity, individuals help or harm 
other people than those who have helped them. Indirect reciprocity comes in two flavours: 
downstream reciprocity follows the maxim ‘do unto thy neighbour as they have done to others’, 
whereas upstream reciprocity follows the maxim ‘do unto thy neighbour as others have done unto 
you’.4 
In this paper we examine group-based upstream reciprocity, or group reciprocity. That is, 
an individual who is harmed (helped) by a member of an outgroup becomes more likely to harm 
(help) others from that group. Whereas group-based downstream reciprocity (Bernhard, Fehr, and 
Fischbacher, 2006; Bernhard, Fischbacher, and Fehr, 2006) follows the maxim ‘do unto others as 
they have done to members of my tribe’, group-based upstream reciprocity follows the maxim ‘do 
unto others as members of their tribe have done to me’ (Figure 3). Tit-for-tat conflict looks like 
negative group reciprocity, i.e., reciprocity where harm is reciprocated with harm. 
 
Figure 1: Upstream reciprocity. (a) Someone who was helped or harmed becomes more likely to 
help or harm others. (b) Upstream group reciprocity targets people who belong to the same group 
                                                 
4
 See Greiner and Levati, (2005), Güth, Königstein, Marchand, and Nehring, (2001), and Tsvetkova and Macy, (2014, 2015) for experimental 
evidence of upstream reciprocity. 
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as the initial partner. 
 
The concept of group reciprocity may help to explain the evolution of intergroup conflict. 
The current literature includes three differing approaches to understanding this. While cultural 
theories argue that there is no innate tendency to intergroup aggression, theories of parochial 
altruism argue that intergroup violence was a driver of within-group altruism via group selection 
processes; as a result, intergroup violence can involve self-sacrifice for one’s group members 
(Bowles, 2009; Choi and Bowles, 2007; Hugh-Jones and Zultan, 2013).
5
 The “chimpanzee 
model”, by contrast, argues that early humans, like chimpanzees, only attack when odds are very 
favourable; thus a human tendency to kill outgroups evolved by individual selection alone 
(Wrangham and Glowacki,2012). This is supported by evidence that both hunter-gatherers and 
chimpanzees are rarely wounded when they attack. 
Kelly, (2000) argues that a defining characteristic of war is “social substitutability”, 
whereby members of a perpetrator’s group become legitimate targets for revenge. Social 
substitutability is especially found in segmented societies, which typically feature strong corporate 
identities such as extended patrilineal families and clans. Some of these societies also have 
“war/peace systems” featuring well-defined institutions for ending conflict as well as beginning it, 
such as the Andamanese Peace Dance or the Montenegrin Court of Good Men for ending feuds 
(Boehm, 1984). By contrast, while chimpanzees do practice reciprocity among alliances within the 
community, they do not reciprocate towards other groups. Instead, they attack stranger 
chimpanzees whenever it is safe to do so. The risk of being attacked forces chimps to avoid 
territory bordering other communities, which limits their available space for foraging (Wilson and 
Wrangham, 2003). While this fact seems to favour the evolution of peaceful intergroup relations 
(Kelly, 2005), that ignores the prisoner’s dilemma structure of intergroup relations; although both 
groups would do better if neither attack—thus avoiding costly conflict—each group does better by 
attacking when the odds are good enough, thereby gaining territory, resources, etc. Indeed, 
peaceful unsegmented societies resolve intergroup conflict by avoiding the other group, which 
entails a loss of access to valuable resources, constricting population expansion. 
The evolution of group reciprocity could deter opportunistic conflict. When there is group 
reciprocity, someone who harms an outgroup member brings retaliation on his own group, and this 
                                                 
5 Empirical studies confirm that outside threat increases within-group cooperation (Born-stein and Ben-Yossef, 1994; Gneezy and Fessler, 2012; 
Weisel and Zultan, 2016). 
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gives his group members an incentive to maintain peace (Boehm, 1984; Fearon and Laitin, 1996). 
Indeed, hunter-gatherers and farmers have similar levels of lethal violence to chimpanzees, but 
much less non-lethal violence (Wrangham, Wilson, and Muller, 2006); this could be because the 
threat of high-level violence can contain low-level violence. Group reciprocity could thus have 
benefited humans by allowing them to exploit more of the land area around them, and to have more 
extensive contacts with outgroups, sustaining a higher population in a given space. So, the 
evidence in Kelly, (2000) that population density is associated with war can be read in two ways: 
the development of war, particularly of war/peace systems, may allow different groups to live at 
high densities in peace. 
Real world examples of apparent intergroup revenge suggest there may be a human 
propensity to group-reciprocate (Bauerlein, 2001; Chagnon, 1988; Horowitz, 1985; Horowitz, 
2001). That is, individuals sometimes, but not always, discriminate against outgroups. Behavior 
toward outgroup members varies on the basis of the individuals’ experiences with the outgroup. In 
this paper, we aim to study the existence and form of the proximate psychological mechanism for 
group reciprocity in modern humans. Although field observations from conflict are highly 
suggestive, it is hard to identify group-reciprocity motives in naturally occurring data. Actions that 
may look like group reciprocity may be rooted in other motivations—such as wishing to signal 
group strength—or reflect centralized group decisions rather than individual tendencies for group 
reciprocity (Gould, 2000; Mamdani, 2001). Moreover, in the field, group reciprocity may be 
conflated with individual level reciprocity, i.e., acts that aim to help or harm the perpetrator, but 
have side effects on the entire group. We therefore designed a controlled laboratory experiment to 
test the human tendency for group reciprocity in a clean way. 
Cleanly identifying group reciprocity requires controlling for three confounds: individual 
level reciprocity; generalized reciprocity, where subjects reciprocate not specifically towards the 
original actor’s group, but towards other people in general; and actions driven by strategic 
reputation-building rather than by a motivation to reciprocate past actions. Our experiment fulfils 
all three: subjects can differentiate the original actor from his or her group members, they interact 
both with these group members and with members of other groups, and we minimize strategic 
concerns by not giving feedback about the reciprocator’s action. 
While previous studies looked at retaliation towards groups, this retaliation does not 
necessarily reflect group reciprocity as defined here. Gaertner, Iuzzini, and O’Mara, (2008) found 
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that rejection by one group member leads to more hostility towards the group when “entitativity” is 
high, i.e. the group is perceived as a unified entity. Since subjects could only display hostility to 
the whole group (by exposing them to unpleasant noise), individual and group level reciprocity 
were confounded. Similarly, Böhm, Rusch, and Gürerk, (2016) examine intergroup retaliation 
using the intergroup prisoner’s dilemma paradigm, but cannot distinguish between individual and 
group reciprocity. Stenstrom, Lickel, Denson, and Miller, (2008) manipulated entitativity by 
making the original perpetrator (a political analyst) “tightly affiliated” with the group (a 
presidential campaign). Under this manipulation, holding the group accountable for the 
perpetrator’s act can be practically and/or legally justified, without resorting to group reciprocity. 
In contrast, we look at how people reciprocate a clear individual act by one group member to an 
uninvolved other group member, where groups are created in the lab and are free of existing social 
context. 
Our experimental set up was the following. Participants were randomly assigned to groups 
and collaborated on a task to build group identity. Next, participants interacted in two strategic 
stages. The upstream action, in which the individual could be helped or harmed by another person, 
was represented by a Trust Game (TG) (Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe, 1995). In this game, the 
Sender (S) receives 150 money-equivalent tokens, and chooses how many of them to send to the 
Responder (R). The amount sent is multiplied by a factor of 3, so that R receives between 0 and 
450 tokens, of which he can send any number back to S. While Rs’ actions clearly have a 
benefit/cost ratio of 1 (money returned to S is lost to R), Ss may send money in the expectation of 
having money returned. In addition, not returning money in the trust game violates a social norm 
(Kimbrough and Vostroknutov, 2016). For these reasons, we expected R’s actions to elicit more 
reciprocity, although we test the effect of both S’s and R’s actions. 
The upstream action was followed by the reciprocal action, in which each individual who 
participated in the TG could help others. We implemented this as an Allocation Game in which 
subjects divided a fixed amount between two recipients. In Direct Reciprocity rounds, the 
recipients included the TG partner; in Group Reciprocity rounds, a member of the TG partner’s 
group; and in Ingroup Favoritism rounds, a member of the allocator’s group. The other recipient 
was always a member of a third, neutral, group. Baseline rounds included two neutral recipients, to 
test whether the TG experience leads to arbitrary discrimination in the absence of any reciprocal or 
group motivations. 
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Our expectations were as follows. First, in Direct Reciprocity rounds, individuals’ 
allocations to their TG partner should positively covary with the amount the partner sent (or 
returned) in the Trust Game. This provides a benchmark to compare group reciprocity against. 
Second, if group reciprocity is present, then allocations to the TG partner’s group member, in 
Group Reciprocity rounds, should also covary with the amount sent or returned by the TG partner. 
Lastly, Ingroup favoritism rounds checked that we had successfully created group identity among 
participants. 
2 Material and methods 
Each session consisted of 24 participants, sitting at isolated computer terminals. At the beginning 
of the experiment, the participants were randomly allocated into six teams of four. Each participant 
was identified throughout the experiment by team colour and individual number (1–4) within the 
team. At the beginning of the experiment, participants were informed that the experiment had five 
distinct stages, and that they might interact with the same people in different stages. Specific 
instructions for each stage were distributed and read aloud at the beginning of the stage. The five 
stages were a group formation stage, the TG stage, the Allocation Game stage, a social value 
orientation elicitation stage (Murphy, Ackermann, and Handgraaf, 2011) and a collectivism scale 
measurement stage (adapted from the horizontal collectivism scale in Singelis, Triandis, Bhawuk, 
and Gelfand, 1995). Other than the collectivism measurement, all decisions were incentivized. The 
results from the social value orientation and collectivism measures did not reveal any systematic 
and interpretable pattern, and are therefore not included in this paper. 
Following (Chen and Li, 2009), we created group identity in the first stage by allowing 
participants to consult each other by anonymous chat while solving a simple task. Participants 
solved five Raven matrices (see supplementary material). Each matrix was presented on screen for 
120 seconds, during which each participant could both send written messages to the team and 
update their own answer. The final answer submitted at the end of the 120 seconds determined 
payoffs, with 10 tokens paid for each correct answer. To further boost group identity through a 
common goal, team members each earned an additional bonus of 5 tokens if all four team members 
answered correctly. 
Next, participants were rematched into pairs to play the one-shot TG. To facilitate 
understanding, participants played five practice rounds, in which they entered decisions both as S 
and as R. In the actual interaction, participants could see their TG partner’s team colour and 
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individual number. 
The third stage Allocation Game consisted of six rounds. In each round, participants 
interacted in groups of three. Individuals in each group were identified to each other by team 
colour and number. Each round consisted of a random dictator game, in which each player chose 
how to divide 100 tokens between the three group members if he or she is chosen to be the 
allocator. The allocator always received exactly 30 tokens, and could freely allocate the remaining 
70 tokens between the other two players. Previous research has found that people do not harm, but 
refrain from helping negatively perceived outgroups (Weisel and Böhm, 2015). Accordingly, we 
set the parameters of the game so that an equal division between the other two players provides 
them with 35 tokens each, more than the allocator’s own share.6 
One round of the six rounds was randomly chosen for payment. In that round, the payoffs 
of the members of each group were determined by the allocation decision of one randomly chosen 
player in the group. No feedback was provided between rounds. At the end of the stage, players 
learned the payoff round, whether their allocation was chosen to determine payoffs, and their 
payoff for the round. Thus, all allocation decisions were completely independent of each other, 
both within and between participants. 
Table 1 shows the matching scheme over the six rounds. Each participant was matched to 
be in the same group of three with a member of their own team in one of the six rounds (ingroup 
condition), with their TG partner in another round (direct reciprocity condition), and in two other 
rounds with other members of the TG partner’s team (group reciprocity condition). The remaining 
two rounds served as the baseline condition. Note that the matching is not independent. For 
example, if one player is in the direct reciprocity condition, then one other player is in the direct 
reciprocity condition and the third player is in either the baseline or group reciprocity condition.
7
 
 
Table 1: Matching example 
Round Allocates to Treatment 
1 Red 1 / Yellow 1 Group reciprocity (GR) 
2 Yellow 4 / Brown 2 Group reciprocity (GR) 
                                                 
6 The allocator’s decision is not costly, which might have introduced additional confounding considerations. As our aim in this paper is to identify 
and study the qualitative characteristics of group reciprocity, we accept the limitations that this choice imposes on the ability to estimate the 
magnitude of preferences for group reciprocity. 
7 Some participants are matched with each other in two different rounds, as Blue 1 and Brown 2 in the example provided in Table 1. This should not 
matter, as only one round is actually paid. The results are robust both to controlling for and to removing repeated encounters from the regressions. 
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3 Green 3 / Yellow 2 Direct reciprocity (DR) 
4 Red 1 / Brown 1 Baseline (B) 
5 Brown 2 / Brown 4 Baseline (B) 
6 Blue 3 / Green 2 Ingroup (IG) 
Note: Example treatments shown for player Blue 2, who played the TG with Yellow 2 (see the supplementary material for the full matching 
scheme). 
 
The fourth stage implemented the slider measure of social value orientation (Crosetto, 
Weisel, and Winter, 2012; Murphy, Ackermann, and Handgraaf, 2011), in which participants 
choose nine allocations between themselves and another member of their team. After the fifth and 
final stage (a non-strategic and non-incentivised collectivism measurement), participants learned 
their cumulative payoff in tokens and were paid in private. One hundred and ninety two 
participants, recruited using ORSEE (Greiner, 2015) participated in eight sessions conducted 
between June 2014 and January 2015. The experiment was programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 
2007). The average payment was approximately $18) for a duration of 70 minutes. The lowest and 
highest payments were approximately $6 and $32, respectively. 
The key outcomes in this design are based on the allocation decisions made in the third 
stage. Direct and group reciprocity can be both positive and negative, and therefore are not 
hypothesized to have a systematic effect on the the amount allocated to either the TG partner or to 
their teammates. Nonetheless—while there is arguably no reason to discriminate between two 
neutral players—we hypothesize that direct and group reciprocity will lead the allocator to 
discriminate either for or against the TG partner or their teammates. Consequently, we predict that 
the absolute difference between the amounts allocated to the two recipients will be larger in all 
treatments compared to the baseline. This difference is measured in our ‘Discrimination’ outcome. 
We measure reciprocity directly by looking at the effect of the TG experience in the second 
stage on allocations made in the third stage. We define the experience with the TG partner in two 
ways. For responders, this is the amount sent to them by their partner. For senders, we calculate the 
amount returned to them by their partner as a fraction of the money available to the responder. 
Thus, an equal split of the pie implies a value of 1/2, and compensating the sender for his 
investment implies a value of 1/3. We subsequently define (direct or group) reciprocity as the 
slope of the allocation made to the TG partner or their teammates on the TG experience. In other 
words, the Group Reciprocity parameter estimates the difference between the amount given to 
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teammates of a TG partner who sent or returned nothing, and the amount given to teammates of a 
partner who sent or returned the maximum amount possible. 
 
3 Results 
We report results on allocations, discrimination between recipients (measured as the absolute 
difference between the two recipients’ allocations), and direct and group reciprocity. All reported 
statistical tests are based on linear regressions with individual-level random effects, per-session 
fixed effects, and standard errors clustered by session. 
 
Table 2: Allocations and Discrimination 
 Allocation Discrimination Reciprocity 
Senders    
Baseline 35.00 (—) 7.25 (5.08) — 
Direct Reciprocity 33.98 (1.61) 25.03 (5.54) *** 17.03 (3.72) *** 
Group Reciprocity 34.41 (0.86) * 11.21 (5.49) ** 9.12 (4.52) * 
In-Group 38.98 (2.16) * 18.56 (5.64) *** 1.62 (8.42) 
Responders    
Baseline 35.00 (—) 3.97 (1.76) — 
Direct Reciprocity 35.38 (1.52) 23.88 (3.06) *** 20.80 (7.76) ** 
Group Reciprocity 34.79 (0.68) 7.82 (2.37) *** 1.13 (2.37) 
In-Group 42.13 (0.79) *** 18.88 (1.67) *** 4.65 (4.87) 
Mean allocation, mean discrimination, and reciprocity (marginal effect on allocation of experience 
with TG partner) by condition. Robust standard errors clustered on sessions. * , ** , and ***  
indicate p <  0.05, p <  0.01, and p <  0.001, respectively. Stars show significance of 
comparison to Baseline. 
 
The first data column in Table 1 presents the mean allocations. Participants gave 
significantly more to members of their own team at the expense of the neutral recipient (
= 2.31, < 0.05z p  for senders, = 8.33, < 0.05z p  for responders), establishing that our group 
formation manipulation was successful in inducing group identity and triggering ingroup 
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favouritism. 
Nonetheless, both positive and negative treatment of the TG partner or their teammates 
increase the absolute difference between the two allocations. Indeed, the second data column of 
Table 1 shows that allocators discriminated significantly more than in the baseline both when 
interacting with their TG partner ( = 8.28, < 0.001z p ) and with their teammates (
= 3.14, < 0.01z p ). This effect was not significantly different between TG senders and receivers 
(F test 3.21, = 0.36p ). 
3.1 Direct and group reciprocity 
The third column of Table 2, Reciprocity, reports the slope of allocations regressed on the subjects’ 
experience with their TG partners. The responder’s experience with the sender is measured as the 
share of the endowment that the sender chose to send. The sender’s experience with the responder 
is measured as the share of the received amount that the responder chose to send back. The 
sender’s experience was not defined for the six (out of 96) senders who did not send any money. 
There is strong direct reciprocity: allocations to the TG partners increase with the TG experience 
both for senders ( = 4.58, < 0.001z p ) and for responders ( = 2.68, < 0.01z p ). 
Group reciprocity, however, is only observed for senders, who allocate less to teammates 
of a responder who returned less. Responders, although directly reciprocating the TG partner’s 
action, do not systematically discriminate against teammates of a sender who sent little. The 
regression analysis shows no significant effect of the responder’s TG experience on their 
allocation to the sender’s teammates ( = 0.48, = 0.63z p ). The sender’s TG experience, on the 
other hand, significantly increases the allocations made to the responder’s teammates (
= 2.02, < 0.05z p ).
8
 The estimated ratio of the group and direct reciprocity coefficients is 54%, so 
that for every allocation dollar a responder loses due to an unkind action in the TG, their 
teammates lose 54 cents. This relationship is shown graphically in Figure 2 (the corresponding 
figure for direct reciprocity is included in the supplementary material). 
 
Figure 2: Allocations in the Group Reciprocity condition versus the TG experience. Circles show 
individual data points (circle size proportional to number of observations). Lines show linear 
                                                 
8 Responders who receive higher amounts also return a higher share. As a result, senders with a more positive TG experience are, on average, those 
who sent more in the TG, creating a potential confound. There is no reason, however, why different senders should systematically discriminate 
between groups in a non-costly way. Indeed, the results hold when we control in the regression for the amount sent and its interaction with the share 
returned.  
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regressions. 
 
4 Discussion 
Our results show that upstream reciprocity is moderated by social boundaries. Humans respond to 
harms from outgroup members under certain circstances by discriminating against others in that 
specific outgroup. 
Group reciprocity as a proximate mechanism bears implications for human social 
cognition. While ingroup altruism and group-based downstream reciprocity require people to 
differentiate their own group from outsiders—“us” from “them”—upstream group reciprocity 
requires them to differentiate between different outgroups—between “them and them”—and to 
keep a mental account of outgroups’ reputation (cf. Tooby, Cosmides, and Price, 2006). Thus, 
group reciprocity could provide a cognitive foundation for the phenomena of intergroup prejudice 
and stereotyping (Allport,1954).
9
 Furthermore, by making group reputation a valuable asset, 
group reciprocity could encourage groups to differentiate themselves symbolically from others, 
and to police their members’ behaviour towards outgroups—both behaviours that we indeed 
observe in humans (Fearon and Laitin, 1996). 
We observed group reciprocity only towards receivers, not senders. On the one hand, we 
find group reciprocity towards receivers, confirming that the experiment was successful in setting 
up the type of group interactions that triggers group reciprocity. On the other hand, we find direct 
reciprocity towards senders, indicating that responders perceived the TG interaction as meaningful 
and relevant for the later allocation decisions. We therefore conclude that it is some characteristic 
of the responder decision, not shared with the sender decision, that triggers group reciprocity. 
One possible interpretation for this difference between senders and responders stems from 
the distinction between intention-based and outcome-based motives in reciprocal behaviour (Falk 
and Fischbacher, 2006; Stanca, Bruni, and Corazzini, 2009). In this sense, senders’ intentions are 
more ambiguous, as they do not know what the responder will do. Responders who do not return 
money, in contrast, are clearly intentionally harming the senders. It is possible that humans 
generalize intentions across group members. That is, if group member 1 takes an action that 
deliberately harms them, they predict that group member 2 wishes to harm them also. If not 
                                                 
9 This argument is a between-group parallel to Yamagishi and Kiyonari, (2000), which argues that expectations of generalized reciprocity lie 
behind altruism within a group. 
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returning money is seen as deliberately harmful, while not sending money can be explained by 
caution or mistrust, then this would generate the difference in group reciprocity that we observe.
10
 
Another distinction made in the literature between trust (sender behavior) and 
trustworthiness (responder behavior) is based on norms and rules of conduct. In their analylsis of 
Adam Smith’s A Theory of Moral Sentiments, Wilson and Smith, (2017) argue that trust is a 
beneficent act, while breaking trust is misconduct. Accordingly, Wilson and Smith, (2017) found 
that people punish responders but not senders. Similarly, Kimbrough and Vostroknutov, (2016) 
found that ‘rule followers’ are more trustworthy than other individuals in the trust game, but not 
more trusting. Thus, our results tentatively suggest that group reciprocity depends on intentionality 
or on social norms underlying human exchange. Further research will be necessary to map and 
understand the boundaries of the group reciprocity phenomenon. 
We mention some caveats and limitations. First, since our study was conducted with 
students from a rich industrialized democracy, results may not generalize to all cultures (Henrich, 
Heine, and Norenzayan, 2010). In particular, the link between intentions and moral judgment may 
vary across cultures (Barrett, Bolyanatz, Crittenden, Fessler, Fitzpatrick, Gurven, Henrich, 
Kanovsky, Kushnick, Pisor, et al., 2016), and this could affect how group reciprocity plays out in 
different societies. Second, our experiment did not differentiate between positive and negative 
group reciprocity: we leave this for future work. 
We have argued that group reciprocity could help explain why some groups have relatively 
peaceful intergroup relations. A further step could be provided by “third party” group reciprocity. 
That is, in many ethnic conflicts, a harm from one group to another is revenged by the entire 
second group, leading to cycles of intergroup violence (Fearon and Laitin,1996). Third party group 
reciprocity could result from organized groups taking collective action to maintain their reputation 
as reciprocal, and therefore dangerous to attack. 
Upstream reciprocity is notoriously difficult to understand in evolutionary terms (Boyd 
and Richerson, 1989; Nowak and Roch, 2007). Group reciprocity may provide another piece of the 
puzzle. Group reciprocity allows individuals to use reciprocal strategies based on group 
reputation. Consequently, upstream reciprocity can direct group-level selection in ways parallel to 
those by which direct reciprocity direct individual-level selection. There are two other ways by 
which group reciprocity may evolve. First, group members are interdependent, especially in the 
                                                 
10 Relately, intergroup contact theory stipulates that contact between groups reduces prejudice by correcting misperceptions of the motives driving 
outgroup behaviors (Pettigrew, 1998). 
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small groups that were common during most of human evolutionary history. Punishing a 
perpetrator’s group member therefore indirectly harms the perpetrator, who is dependent on his 
peers for , e.g., public goods provision. Thus, group reciprocity may bridge upstream indirect 
reciprocity and direct reciprocity through intra-group dependencies. Second, the evolution of 
indirect reciprocity acts by way of chains of reciprocal actions, which return with some probability 
to the original instigator of the chain (Nowak and Roch, 2007). In a population organised in 
groups, such that individuals interact more frequently with their own group members, group 
reciprocity may increase the likelihood of successful reciprocal chains, facilitating the evolution of 
upstream reciprocity. These ideas could be formalized in future work. 
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SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS 
Appendix A: Complete matching scheme 
Period 
Group 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 
Blue 2 
(GR) 
Blue 1 
(GR) 
Green 4 
(GR) 
Blue 3 (B) Red 2 
(DR) 
Blue 4 (B) Green 1 
(IG) 
Red 4 (B) 
Red 1 (B) Yellow 2 
(GR) 
Brown 4 
(B) 
Green 3 
(GR) 
Brown 2 
(DR) 
Red 3 
(DR) 
Green 2 
(IG) 
Yellow 3 
(IG) 
Yellow 1 
(GR) 
Purple 2 
(B) 
Purple 3 
(GR) 
Purple 4 
(GR) 
Purple 1 
(B) 
Brown 3 
(DR) 
Brown 1 
(B) 
Yellow 4 
(IG) 
2 
Green 3 
(GR) 
Red 3 (B) Blue 4 
(GR) 
Blue 2 
(GR) 
Blue 3 
(DR) 
Green 2 
(DR) 
Blue 1 (B) Red 2 (IG) 
Yellow 1 
(B) 
Green 1 
(GR) 
Green 4 
(B) 
Yellow 4 
(GR) 
Red 1 (B) Brown 4 
(B) 
Brown 1 
(IG) 
Red 4 (IG) 
Purple 1 
(GR) 
Purple 3 
(GR) 
Yellow 2 
(GR) 
Brown 2 
(B) 
Yellow 3 
(DR) 
Purple 2 
(DR) 
Brown 3 
(IG) 
Purple 4 
(B) 
3 
Red 1 
(GR) 
Red 4 
(GR) 
Blue 3 (B) Red 3 
(GR) 
Green 4 
(DR) 
Blue 2 
(DR) 
Blue 1 
(IG) 
Yellow 3 
(B) 
Brown 4 
(GR) 
Yellow 4 
(B) 
Red 2 
(GR) 
Green 2 
(B) 
Yellow 1 
(B) 
Green 3 
(B) 
Blue 4 
(IG) 
Purple 2 
(IG) 
Purple 1 
(B) 
Brown 1 
(GR) 
Brown 3 
(GR) 
Brown 2 
(GR) 
Purple 4 
(DR) 
Yellow 2 
(DR) 
Green 1 
(B) 
Purple 3 
(IG) 
4 
Blue 4 
(GR) 
Blue 3 
(GR) 
Green 2 
(GR) 
Blue 1 (B) Red 4 
(DR) 
Blue 2 (B) Green 3 
(IG) 
Red 2 (B) 
Red 3 (B) Yellow 4 
(GR) 
Brown 2 
(B) 
Green 1 
(GR) 
Brown 4 
(DR) 
Red 1 
(DR) 
Green 4 
(IG) 
Yellow 1 
(IG) 
Yellow 3 
(GR) 
Purple 4 
(B) 
Purple 1 
(GR) 
Purple 2 
(GR) 
Purple 3 
(B) 
Brown 1 
(DR) 
Brown 3 
(B) 
Yellow 2 
(IG) 
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5 
Green 4 
(GR) 
Red 4 (B) Blue 3 
(GR) 
Blue 1 
(GR) 
Blue 4 
(DR) 
Green 1 
(DR) 
Blue 2 (B) Red 1 (IG) 
Yellow 2 
(B) 
Green 2 
(GR) 
Green 3 
(B) 
Yellow 3 
(GR) 
Red 2 (B) Brown 3 
(B) 
Brown 2 
(IG) 
Red 3 (IG) 
Purple 2 
(GR) 
Purple 4 
(GR) 
Yellow 1 
(GR) 
Brown 1 
(B) 
Yellow 4 
(DR) 
Purple 1 
(DR) 
Brown 4 
(IG) 
Purple 3 
(B) 
6 
Red 2 
(GR) 
Red 3 
(GR) 
Blue 4 (B) Red 4 
(GR) 
Green 3 
(DR) 
Blue 1 
(DR) 
Blue 2 
(IG) 
Yellow 4 
(B) 
Brown 3 
(GR) 
Yellow 3 
(B) 
Red 1 
(GR) 
Green 1 
(B) 
Yellow 2 
(B) 
Green 4 
(B) 
Blue 3 
(IG) 
Purple 1 
(IG) 
Purple 2 
(B) 
Brown 2 
(GR) 
Brown 4 
(GR) 
Brown 1 
(GR) 
Purple 3 
(DR) 
Yellow 1 
(DR) 
Green 2 
(B) 
Purple 4 
(IG) 
 
Appendix B: Allocations in the DR condition 
 
Figure B.1: Allocations in the Direct Reciprocity condition versus the TG experience. Circles 
show individual data points (circle size proportional to number of observations). Lines show linear 
regressions. 
 
Appendix C: Experimental instructions 
Instructions for the experiment 
<Presented as a pdf document and available throughout the experiment> 
These instructions are identical to all the participants. 
The experiment is composed of five separate and different phases. At the beginning of the 
experiment, all participants will be allocated into teams of four. Each team has a unique colour. 
These teams will remain fixed throughout the experiment. 
Before each part, we will distribute and read the relevant instructions for that part. In each part the 
participants will be reallocated into groups. The number of participants in a group can change from 
part to part. The payments in the part will be determined according to the decisions of the 
participants in the group. It is possible, but not necessary, that another participant will be in the 
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same group as you in two different parts. In each part of the experiment you will be able to know 
which team each of the participants in your group belongs to. 
Your final payment in the experiment will be the total of your gain in all of the parts. 
At the end of the experiment, you will be presented with the payments in each part and your total 
payment, in points and in shekels. Please remain seated until the experimenter calls you for 
payment. 
If you have any questions, please raise your hand now and the experimenter will come to 
you. 
 
Experiments for the first part 
In this part, you and the members of your team perform a pattern completion task. The computer 
will present you with five questions. Each question is comprised of eight pictures, and the team 
members wil be asked to choose a ninth picture out of eight possible pictures to complete the 
pattern. For example: 
 
[[Image]] 
 
Each team member must answer all of the questions. For each correct answer, the team member 
will receive 10 points. Additionally, if all of the team members answer correctly, the whole team 
will receive a team bonus of 20 points, to be equally divided among the team members. 
Each question will be allocated two minutes. During this time, the team members can consult 
each other using electronic chat. Enter your answer and click Confirm. You can change your 
answer and click Confirm again at any point during the two minutes. The last answer to be entered 
is the final answer. 
Attention: Do not reveal any identifying information. If any participant in the session identifies 
themselves, we will stop the experiment and release all participants with only the showup fee. 
If you have any questions, please raise your hand now and the experimenter will come to 
you. 
 
Instructions for the second part 
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In this part participants will be matched in pairs. In each pair, one participant will be in role A and 
the other participant in role B. Participant A receives an allocation of 150 points and decides how 
many of the 150 points to send to Participant B. The amount is tripled. Next, Participant B will 
decide how many points out of the points received to send back to to Participant A. These points 
will not be multiplied. 
If you are allocated to role A, your payment in this part will be: 
[[Image]] 
If you are allocated to role B, your payment in this part will be: 
[[Image]] 
Before making your decision, you will be able to test the payment calculation in a practice phase, 
in which you will be able to make decisions as both Participant A and as Participant B. In this 
stage, you will enter decisions in both roles, and see the final payments. The practice will repeat 
five times. 
If you have any questions, please raise your hand now and the experimenter will come to 
you. 
 
Instructions for the third part 
In the third part, all participants will be matched in groups of three. Each of the three participants 
in the group will choose how to divide 100 points between the three group members, such that he 
himself receives 30 points, and freely allocates the remaining 70 points between the other two 
group members. This stage has 6 rounds, and you will be rematched in a new group. 
 
Payment calculation in the part 
At the end of the experiment, the computer will randomly choose one of the six rounds, and one 
participant in each group. The payment for this part will be determined according to the decision of 
the randomly chosen participant in the randomly chosen round. 
If you have any questions, please raise your hand now and the experimenter will come to 
you. 
 
Instructions for the fourth part 
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In this part, participant will be matched in pairs. 
Each participant will be presented with 6 rulers that include nine possible allocations of money to 
the two participants. The amount you chose to keep for yourself is indicated above each ruler, and 
the amount you choose to give to the other participant is indicated below the ruler. You are to 
choose your preferred allocation of the nine possible allocations. For example, 
[[Image]] 
You can choose any point on the ruler. For example, assume you chose the point marked in red. 
You will receive 85 points and the other participant will receive 33 points. 
At the end of the part, the computer will randomly choose on of the two participants in the pair and 
one of the nine rulers. your payment in this part will be determined by the decision of the randomly 
chosen participant for the randomly chosen ruler. 
If you have any questions, please raise your hand now and the experimenter will come to 
you. 
 
Instructions for the fifth part 
In this part you will be asked to answer several questions. The questions have to do with the way 
one sees himself and his surroundings in different situations. Your task is to indicate how much 
you agree or disagree with each statement, using the following scale: 
1. Strongly disagree. 
2. Disagree. 
3. Neither agree nor disagree. 
4. Agree. 
5. Strongly agree. 
Note: there are no right and wrong answers. Please indicate the answer that best reflects your 
character with respect to the statement. Take your time and think about your answer. 
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